In 2023, the Scattered Spider group compromised MGM Resorts by identifying a privileged attack path through Active Directory in under 10 minutes — no zero-days required. They used exactly the kind of graph-based enumeration that BloodHound automates. If you’re not mapping your own AD attack paths before attackers do, you’re flying blind.
Collecting AD Data with SharpHound
BloodHound is an open-source tool that maps Active Directory relationships as a graph database, exposing privilege escalation paths that manual audits routinely miss. It has two parts: SharpHound (the collector that runs on Windows and pulls AD data) and the BloodHound UI (a Neo4j-backed graph you query).
Start collection from a domain-joined machine or via a compromised user account. Here’s the most common invocation:
# Run SharpHound as domain user j.carter on CORP.LOCAL
.\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethods All --Domain corp.local --ZipFileName corp_bh_20261121.zip
[+] Creating output directory at C:\Users\j.carter\AppData\Local\Temp\bloodhound
[+] Resolved domain to: CORP.LOCAL (192.0.2.10)
[+] Collection Methods: Group, LocalAdmin, GPOLocalGroup, Session, LoggedOn,
Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DCOM, SPNTargets, PSRemote
[+] Enumeration finished in 00:02:14
[+] Compressing data to corp_bh_20261121.zip
[+] SharpHound Enumeration Completed at 09:14:33 EST on 11/21/2026
That two-minute run just mapped every group membership, local admin relationship, ACL, and active session across your domain. The resulting ZIP contains JSON files — one per object type — ready to import into BloodHound.
Upload the ZIP via the BloodHound UI (drag-and-drop into the interface). Once ingested, your Neo4j instance holds a complete relationship graph of your AD environment. Now the real work begins.
Finding the Shortest Path to Domain Admin
BloodHound’s most dangerous query is also its most useful: Find Shortest Paths to Domain Admins. Run it from the Analysis tab the moment your data loads. But the built-in queries only tell half the story. The real power is in the raw Cypher query language that Neo4j uses.
Paste this directly into the BloodHound raw query box:
MATCH p=shortestPath(
(u:User {name:"J.CARTER@CORP.LOCAL"})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL"})
)
RETURN p
// BloodHound graph result — path rendered as:
J.CARTER@CORP.LOCAL
--[MemberOf]-->
HELPDESK@CORP.LOCAL
--[GenericWrite]-->
SVC_BACKUP@CORP.LOCAL
--[MemberOf]-->
DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL
Read this path carefully. User j.carter is in the HELPDESK group. That group holds GenericWrite over the service account svc_backup. And svc_backup is a Domain Admin.
GenericWrite lets an attacker modify the target object’s attributes — including msDS-KeyCredentialLink, enabling a Shadow Credentials attack. Or they can set an SPN on svc_backup and Kerberoast it offline. Either way, Domain Admin falls in one or two more steps.
An attacker finding this path would immediately target the HELPDESK group members. As a defender, your next move is revoking GenericWrite, moving svc_backup out of Domain Admins, and auditing every other service account with elevated group membership.
Hunting Kerberoastable and High-Value Targets
Not every attack path runs through ACL abuse. Kerberoasting — requesting TGS tickets for accounts with SPNs and cracking them offline — is still one of the most reliable lateral movement techniques in production environments. BloodHound surfaces every Kerberoastable account in one query:
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
WHERE u.admincount = true
RETURN u.name, u.description, u.pwdlastset
// Output:
u.name u.description u.pwdlastset
------------------------------ ------------------------- ------------------
SVC_BACKUP@CORP.LOCAL Backup service account 2021-03-14 08:22:11
SVC_DEPLOY@CORP.LOCAL CI/CD deployment svc 2022-07-01 14:05:33
SVC_SQL01@CORP.LOCAL SQL Server 2019 on DB01 2020-11-30 09:41:00
Three accounts. All have SPNs. All carry admincount=true (meaning they were once in a privileged group). And look at those password ages — svc_sql01 hasn’t rotated since 2020. A 6-character service account password from 2020 cracks in minutes on a modern GPU rig.
An attacker requests these TGS tickets with Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:hashes.txt, then throws the file at hashcat. As a defender, this output is your remediation priority list: enforce 25+ character managed passwords via Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA), and strip admincount from accounts that no longer need it.
What To Do Right Now
Download SharpHound CE from the official BloodHound Community Edition repo, run it against your own domain today with a standard user account, and import the results. Run the Find Principals with DCSync Rights built-in query first — it takes 30 seconds and has uncovered misconfigurations in nearly every environment we’ve tested. What you find will tell you exactly where to spend the next sprint.
